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Temporal Analysis of Political Instability through
Descriptive Subgroup Discovery
DANIEL LAMBACH
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DRAGAN GAMBERGER
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Zagreb, Croatia
This paper analyzes the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) data set using a new
methodology based on machine learning tools for subgroup discovery. While the PITF
used static data, this study employs both static and dynamic descriptors covering the
5-year period before onset. The methodology provides several descriptive models of
countries especially prone to political instability. For the most part, these models cor-
roborate the PITF’s findings and support earlier theoretical works. The paper also shows
the value of subgroup discovery as a tool for developing a unified concept of political
instability as well as for similar research designs.
Keywords dynamic variables, political instability task force, subgroup discovery
Introduction
The study of intrastate conflict, from revolutions and coups to ethnic conflict, civil wars, and
genocide, has been one of the most active fields in the post-World War II, and especially the
post–Cold War social sciences. As a result, our knowledge about the onset and duration of
such crises has increased markedly. Recently, the field has come to be dominated by quan-
titative studies, which have yielded impressive results about factors correlating closely with
conflict. These studies, whether they employ regression models, econometric approaches,
or other statistical methods, assume that the cases they code as “civil wars” (or whatever
the dependent variable) are sufficiently alike to merit being grouped in a single category,
and that all cases with a given outcome have developed along the same lines. This raises
two potential methodological problems. First, can we be sure that all cases that are coded
the same on their outcome variable are actually alike, and if not, how do we determine
clusters of distinctive cases? And second, even if the cases are similar, can we rule out the
possibility of equifinality, i.e., that different cases might have developed along different
paths but ended up in the same state (George & Bennett, 2005)?
This paper presents results of an effort to apply the methodology of knowledge discov-
ery in databases for the qualitative analysis of social science data. Specifically, we use the
Address correspondence to Daniel Lambach, Institute for Development and Peace (INEF), Universita¨t
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recently developed method of subgroup discovery to solve the two methodological prob-
lems mentioned above. We employ this methodology to analyze data previously gathered
by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) to identify potential correlates of political
instability. In the next section, we will give an overview of current literature on the causes
and correlates of intrastate conflict, including the findings of the PITF. We then describe
the data set and introduce the methodology. Subsequently, we discuss several possible de-
scriptive models for the onset of political instability that emerge from the analysis. Finally,
we offer some tentative conclusions drawn from these findings.
Review of the Literature
Current quantitative literature on intrastate conflict (as an umbrella term for ethnic conflicts,
civil war, and similar phenomena of domestic political instability) is primarily concerned
with the explanation of the onset, the severity (Lacina, 2006) and the duration of conflict
(Fearon, 2004). A number of factors have been identified as positively affecting conflict
onset. These include a lack of state capacity (Fearon & Laitin, 2003), low economic prosper-
ity, lootable resources (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001), population size (Sambanis, 2004), earlier
conflict in the same country or ongoing conflicts in neighboring countries (Esty et al.,
1998b), and a “hybrid” regime type (Hegre et al., 2001). Population density and distance
to the capital city can also affect conflict risk. However, the influence of these last variables
is conditioned by the type of conflict (Buhaug & Rød, 2006). In contrast, several variables
are considered either to be insignificant or to produce mixed results, among them ethno-
linguistic fractionalization and rough terrain (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Buhaug & Rød, 2006).
As Sambanis (2004) has pointed out, by employing different data sets using varying
definitions of their dependent variable, these studies have sometimes come to starkly dif-
ferent conclusions. Instances of civil war that are coded in one data set are missing in
another. Sambanis suggests that this might have skewed results, for example with regard
to ethno-linguistic fractionalization: “The results presented here show that the estimated
coefficients of most variables vary widely as a result of changes in the coded onset of civil
war” (Sambanis, 2004: 855).
These studies, just like the PITF, employ static variables as causal factors for the
explanation of conflict onset. Changes in these variables are implicitly recorded in new
values for the next country-year cases in the data set. With very few exceptions (GDP
growth), dynamic indicators per se are not considered to be relevant independent variables.
This is in stark contrast to earlier literature on the social and political roots of conflict.
Huntington, for example, theorized that political conflict may result from the modernization
of society, which creates new demands for participation exceeding the institutional capacity
of the political system (Huntington, 1969: 4).
The Political Instability Task Force
The PITF was founded in 1994 under the name State Failure Task Force (SFTF) at the
request of the United States government (Esty et al., 1998a). The SFTF’s original aim, as
the founding name implied, had been to identify the root causes of state failure. However,
preliminary research showed that only 18 episodes of state failure had occurred in the initial
time frame of 1955–1994, too few for meaningful quantitative analysis (Esty et al., 1995).
As a result, the Task Force broadened the concept of state failure so that it included a wider
range of phenomena, namely, adverse regime changes, genocides/politicides, revolutionary
wars, and ethnic conflict. The SFTF acknowledged that this differed from the prior definition
of state failure by renaming itself the Political Instability Task Force in 2003.
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In its early stages, the PITF1 compiled a data set encompassing 195 countries in the
period from 1955 to 1994 (later updated to include events up to 2004).2 Each country was
described by 87 political, demographic, economic, social, and environmental variables that
had been collected from different sources, including the World Bank and United Nations.
In the above period, 131 instances of “state failure” (hereafter referred to as “positive
cases”) had been recorded in 96 different countries. Since the PITF was trying to construct
a predictive model, data from 2 years prior to the instability was combined with the outcome
variable. The same procedure was employed for constructing negative (control) cases, three
of which were added to the data set for each positive case. Control cases were defined
as not having experienced instability during the 5-year period immediately preceding and
following the sampling year.
The goal of the PITF is the development of statistical models that can be used to identify
countries at greater risk of political instability (Esty et al., 1998b). Initially, single-variable
correlations were used to detect potentially significant variables that were then subjected
to multivariate logistic regression and neural network modeling. In its Phase I report, the
Task Force identified a combination of three variables as providing the best predictive
power: high infant mortality, partial democracy, and low trade openness. This global model
was able to predict the positive cases with an accuracy of 60% (Esty et al., 1995). In the
second and third phases, this model was refined by adding further independent variables,
namely a large population and high population density as well as two or more bordering
states with major civil conflict. Including these variables improved the model’s accuracy
to 72%. There are differences in the predictive power of these six variables, with quality
of life (for which infant mortality is a proxy) and regime type being the most robust. In
addition, the PITF developed special models for specific outcome types (e.g., ethnic war)
or selected geographical areas (e.g., sub-Saharan Africa, Muslim countries). These models
usually attained a level of accuracy around 80%. However, with regard to the global model,
it is doubtful whether substantial improvements in prediction accuracy can be realized with
this data set and methodology without further loss of parsimony.
Despite these achievements, the PITF has been criticized on theoretical and method-
ological grounds. On a theoretical level, the most obvious charge against the PITF has long
been that what it was studying was not state failure at all. This concept of state failure
describes a breakdown of political order and state institutions and is at once both wider and
quite different from the four kinds of political instability that the PITF included (Zartman,
1995). For example, state failure theorists would in most cases reject the notion that adverse
regime change be considered as a positive case (unless it was particularly violent and took a
long time to take effect). The PITF admitted as much in its first report (Esty et al., 1995), but
continued to denote its positive cases “state failures,” thereby contributing to the confusion.
The issue was further obscured by the PITF’s unwillingness to provide a clear definition of
its dependent variable beyond a simple typology of events classified as state failure.
Even if this critique had merely been an issue of semantics, the lack of a theoretical
core led to further problems. King and Zeng (2001) have pointed out that the different
kinds of positive cases (adverse regime change, revolutionary war, ethnic war, genocide)
actually were discrete types of events with quite distinct causes. This critique was somewhat
countered by the PITF’s development of separate causal models for these outcome types.
1To facilitate reading, we will refer to the task force as PITF even when talking about its work
before its re-christening in 2003.
2In an intermediate step, the data set had been updated until 1999. This was the most current ver-
sion of the data set when work on our project began, therefore the data set underlying the present paper
covers events between 1955 and 1999. A public version of the data set, including documentation as well
as all three reports is available on the PITF website at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfdata.htm.
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However, subsuming analytically distinct events into a single category at best reduces
theoretical leverage; at worst, it produces misleading results (Sartori, 1970). It raises the
danger of equifinality, since differences between positive cases can stem from divergent
causal structures. One way to address this problem would be to disaggregate the dependent
variable into clusters of related cases and then to analyze these clusters separately, as the
PITF did through its development of separate models. However, this strategy then raises the
question how such clusters should be determined. The PITF opted for a deductive approach,
i.e., it defined the four kinds of positive outcomes on theoretical grounds. Such an approach
again carries the risk for concept misformation: how can we be sure that, for example,
revolutionary war and ethnic war are distinct groups of cases, or that all cases of adverse
regime change are sufficiently alike to be considered the same class of events?
Other lines of criticism have pointed out the limitations of the PITF’s approach. Schrodt
(2002) criticized the PITF and similar data-mining efforts as only producing correlations
without addressing issues of causation. This point is illustrated by infant mortality—it is
clear that infant mortality per se does not cause political violence. However, it is a good
indicator for conditions of social squalor, which, in turn, are potential sources of conflict.
And while causality and explanation were never on the PITF’s agenda, it is important to
be aware of this shortcoming. Finally, the limits of the global model are highlighted when
looking at specific cases. Daun (2003) has conducted an independent single-case study
of the representation of Colombia in the PITF data set: 4 country-years were included as
either positive or negative outcomes; in three of these cases, the global model predicted the
wrong result. This is a general weakness of the global model that is especially pronounced
in “marginal” cases like Colombia, where violence takes a less ubiquitous form than, for
example, in Somalia.
Subgroup Discovery Methodology
Cases in our analysis are represented by periods of 5 country-years without political instabil-
ity. Positive cases encompass those periods immediately preceding a year with a recognized
instability, while negative cases are those where political instability did not occur for at least
another 5 years after the conclusion of the initial 5–year period. From each of the 87 vari-
ables available in the data set per country-year, we constructed 11 descriptors representing
the 5-year time sequence. They are: mean value over 5 years; minimum value; maximum
value; slope; standard deviation; range (maximum − minimum value); positive distortion
(maximum − mean value); negative distortion (mean − minimum value); temporal distance
between extremes (position of the minimum − position of the maximum value in years);
relative distance of the minimum value in respect to the beginning of the time sequence; and
relative distance of the maximum value in respect to the beginning of the time sequence.
These descriptors reflect both absolute (static) properties of the input variable (mean,
maximum, minimum values, range, distortions), and temporal (dynamic) properties of the
changes (slope, positions of the extremes, standard deviation). The result is that, due to the
described data preparation phase, each case is represented by 957 numerical descriptors.
The subgroup discovery algorithm that follows uses only these descriptor values as input.3
The set of cases consists of the group of positive cases P (countries experiencing
political instability) and a control group of negative cases N (countries not experiencing
3It should be noted that the advantage of the applied subgroup discovery approach is that, due to
the built-in anti-overfitting measures, the methodology can accept a large number of input variables
even when the number of cases is relatively modest. For example, in the functional genomics domain
successful experiments have been done with as much as 16,000 descriptors (Gamberger et al., 2004).
In contrast to multivariate logistic regression modeling that needs to have explicit single-variable
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political instability). The goal of the subgroup discovery algorithm is to construct rules that
are true for positive cases and false for negative cases. It is not necessary that rules are
true for all positive cases and false for all negative cases, but the intention is to find short
rules that are true for large subsets of positive examples and at the same time that are false
for large subsets of negative examples. Subgroup sizes are not defined in advance but the
algorithm tends to make them as large as possible. A rule with ideal covering properties
is true for all positive cases and not true for all negative ones. Positive cases covered by a
rule are also called “true positives” and denoted by TP, while negative cases covered by the
rule are called “false positives” (FP). All remaining negative cases not covered by the rule
are called “true negatives” (TN). An ideal rule has TP = P and TN = N, and because of
N = TN + FP the ideal rule has FP = 0.
The first step in the rule construction process is the construction of all possible “features”
representing elementary rule building blocks. For descriptors on an interval scale the features
have the form Descriptor > value or Descriptor < value. Examples from the PITF data set
are ‘mean population density > 40.8 or slope of change of GDP per capita < 0.15. For each
input descriptor, there can be many different features and the process of their construction is
well defined. Practically for each pair of one positive and one negative case it is possible to
construct one feature for every descriptor. For example, if we have a positive case with mean
population density = 30 and a negative case with ‘mean population density = 35, then a
feature ‘mean population density < 32.5 may be constructed. This feature will successfully
discriminate between these two cases because it is true for the positive case and false for
the negative one. Many features constructed this way can be immediately discarded if they
are only true for a small number of positive cases or if they are false for a small number
of negative cases. The reason is that such features are potentially bad rule building blocks
because they may lead to results that are overfitted to the available data set and do not
describe general relationships. All other features with reasonably good covering properties
enter the rule construction process. For the PITF data set, we only accepted features that
were true for at least 10 positive cases and, at the same time, that were false for 10 to 15
negative cases, depending on the total number of negative cases.
The central part of the rule construction process is the optimization algorithm searching
for combinations of features with optimal covering properties on the given set of cases. It
is assumed that features can be connected only by logical conjunction. This means that a
combination of features is true for a case only if all features are true for the case and that a
combination of features is false for a case if any of the features is false for it. In the subgroup
discovery approach, the following rule quality measure Q is used as the optimization goal
in the heuristic search of rules:
Q = TP/(FP + g)
where g is an appropriately selected generalization parameter. High quality rules will have
a large Q value and they will cover most positive cases (large TP) and a low number of
negative cases (small FP). The number of negative cases tolerated, relative to the number
of positive ones covered by the rule, is determined by the parameter g. Rules presented in
this work have been induced with g being in the range between 5 and 20. The quality of
constructed rules is measured by two values: sensitivity which is equal to TP/P and which
represents the proportion of positive cases classified as true positives, and specificity which
correlation tests in the preprocessing stage in order to reduce the number of inputs to ensure the
construction of reasonable models, this approach allows even further expansion of the number of
input descriptors.
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is equal to TN/N and which represents the proportion of negative cases classified as true
negatives. Very good rules have high sensitivity and high specificity, but rules can also be
useful if only one of the values is very high.
An example of a real rule constructed for the PITF domain consisting of two features
is the following: position of the maximum population value > 2.5 (maximum population
is reached in the second half of the 5-year cycle) and ‘difference between maximum and
minimum values of infant mortality > 7.2. This rule has a sensitivity of 42% (it is true for
50 of 118 positive examples) and a specificity of 78% (it is false for 179 of 229 negative
examples where data for both descriptor values is present). This rule is actually the base
for the model F1 presented in this work. The transformation from the rule form into the
descriptive form is the result of a statistical comparison of the subgroup of 50 positive
cases described by the rule on the one hand and all available negative cases on the other.
As expected, all positive examples that are true for the rule have increasing population
(maximum value near the onset of instability) and large differences in infant mortality in
a 5-year period. Moreover, these cases have also significantly decreasing infant mortality
characterized by a significant negative slope for infant mortality as well as a significant
positive slope for total population. Therefore, the main properties of the model are described
as “countries characterized by significantly increasing population as a result of rapidly
decreasing infant mortality.” There can also be other significant differences between the
subgroup of positive cases and all negative cases. These differences are listed in the model
description as additional but not necessary properties. In the current example, model F1 has
“decreasing GDP” (detected as the negative mean value of the slope of GDP for selected
positive cases in contrast to the positive mean value that characterizes negative cases) and
“growing urban population” as additional characteristics.
The other models presented in this work have been constructed the same way. Although
the induced rules should have high predictive accuracy characterized by high sensitivity and
specificity values, the real relevance of rules lies in the automatic detection of relevant sub-
groups of positive cases. Analysis of the statistical properties of these subgroups necessitates
the evaluation and interpretation of underlying concepts during the transformation from rule
form into model descriptions by an expert in the topic under study. Thus, the advantage of
the methodology is that it actively includes human background knowledge and experience
into the data analysis process. The disadvantage is that the process may result in different
model descriptions depending on the expertise and preferences of the involved social sci-
entist. Initially, the process can be influenced by selecting higher or lower values for the
generalization parameter, g, during the rule generation process. Later, the expert can sig-
nificantly influence the model description by highlighting different additional properties of
the model. Also, the approach does not eliminate Schrodt’s critique of the PITF’s approach
(see above) in that it still detects correlation and not causation. Nevertheless, the human
evaluation of hypotheses leaves enough freedom for experts to try to detect and incorporate
causation into theories that are built based on the induced hypotheses. It also allows us to
avoid the pitfalls of concept misformation through the inductive creation of subgroups.
The methodology used in this work represents recent advances in the field of intelligent
data analysis. It has already been successfully applied in the fields of medicine (Gamberger
et al., 2003), functional genomics (Gamberger et al., 2004), and chemistry (Baker et al.,
2004), but it is yet to be generally accepted as a standard approach of data analysis. A goal
of this study is to demonstrate its applicability to the social sciences and stimulate broader
awareness of its potentials, while methodological details are outside the scope of this paper
(Gamberger & Lavracˇ, 2002).
The computational aspect of the methodology is relatively complex because it makes
use of a complete Inductive Learning by Logic Minimization (ILLM) system implemented
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at the Rudjer Boskovic Institute, Zagreb. Outside researchers interested in the application of
the methodology can access the Data Mining Server, publicly available at http://dms.irb.hr,
which enables the use of the subgroup discovery tool with user-submitted data. The server
presents a very simple and user-friendly interface to the data analysis process, but is limited
to 250 cases and 50 descriptors for the sake of public availability. To allow for more complex
experiments, please contact the authors of the paper.
The Experimental Setting
In the first phase, we experimented with a data set consisting of 118 positive and 259 neg-
ative (control) examples. This data set will be referred to as the F set. The positive cases
included all examples for which a preceding 5-year period of political stability existed.
Selection of negative examples was relatively random but the intention was to include neg-
ative cases, where possible, both for countries which had also generated a positive case, as
well as a number of negative examples from countries which did not experience political
instability, preferably in the same time periods when positive cases had been generated for
other countries. The results obtained were very helpful to illustrate the methodology and its
potentials, although later evaluation by a political scientist showed that some positive cases
had been included in the data set even though they had not been independent states for the
entire preceding 5-year period, raising doubts about the reliability of data. Moreover, expert
analysis showed that relying on negative examples drawn from stable and developed coun-
tries produced biased results that more often reflected other, more general socio-economic
differences between these countries and positive cases rather than differences in political
stability as such.
To circumvent the problems detected in the first phase, we then designed two additional
experiments. Positive cases remained the same in both experiments: There are 87 cases of
political instability that satisfied the conditions that the countries had been independent
and stable for at least 5 years before political instability set in and that the 5-year period
started after 1955. In the first of these experiments, which will be referred to as the M data
set, negative cases were constructed using countries that had never experienced political
instability. For each such country (99 in total) two negative cases were constructed with
randomly chosen 5-year periods, taking care that these two periods are at least 20 years
apart. If it was not possible to guarantee a 20-year interval (because of the relatively recent
independence of a country), a minimum distance of 10 years was employed, and if this was
still not possible, only a single case was constructed for the country. In total, this gave us
181 negative cases for the M set. This set is intended to highlight immanent properties that
differentiate unstable countries from stable ones.
In the second experiment, a different data set (the S set) was constructed with the
aim of detecting which variables were most successful in predicting why and when similar
countries remained stable or became unstable. To do that, the negative cases in the S set
were taken only from countries that had experienced political instability at some other point.
For each such country, we tried to find two periods of 5 years which could serve as negative
cases: one which was before the onset of instability and another one after its termination. For
each negative case, a minimum distance of 10 years to the positive case had to be present.
If this was not possible, negative cases with a shorter distance (but not less than 5 years)
were accepted. For some countries that experienced a particularly long period of instability
(or that had only recently become independent), it was only possible to construct a single
negative case, or, for a few countries, no negative case at all. However, it was possible to
extract a few additional negative cases from countries which had experienced instability
but were dropped from the data set because reliable data had not been present for at least 5
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years prior to the onset of instability (see above). This produced a total count of 96 negative
cases for data set S.
In the following section we present the results from the analysis of the data sets. It
should be pointed again that the method of subgroup discovery does not produce hard
and fast results, but helps formulate specific hypotheses through the inductive discovery
of subgroups of cases sharing characteristics overlooked otherwise. Therefore, the induced
models were later evaluated by asking how well they conform to theory, other research
findings and expert knowledge on political instability.
General Political Instability Models (Induced from the F Set)
From the data set constructed in the first phase (F set), it was possible to detect increasing
population and a change in GDP per capita as the most relevant driving forces for political
instability. The following specific models were constructed:
Model F1
Countries characterized by significantly increasing population as a result of rapidly de-
creasing infant mortality. Additional, but not necessary, characteristics are decreasing GDP
per capita and growing urban population. Such countries are more likely to suffer an ad-
verse regime change than other countries. An example of such a case would be South Korea
in 1961. Model sensitivity is 42% and specificity is 78%. This pattern closely resembles
theoretical models from the literature on modernizing and developing countries. Numerous
forces of social change coincide: growing demographic pressure coupled with urbanization
provide for a tight job market and social dislocation, creating the structural conditions for
conflict. An economic recession then becomes the proximate cause of violent conflict. This
model agrees with the explanations by Huntington outlined above.
Model F2
Small countries with an increasing number of conflict in bordering states in combination
with increasing trade openness. Additional characteristics are small size, a strongly de-
creasing GDP per capita and decreasing population. The most frequent outcomes are ethnic
wars and complex cases (a combination of several different outcome variables). Bosnia in
1992 is a typical representative of this concept. Model sensitivity is 32% and specificity
is 87%. F2 does not lend itself to a parsimonious interpretation like F1 does. It is poten-
tially interesting because it does not agree with existing theories of political instability. The
combination of the factors “neighboring conflicts” and “trade openness” is very unusual.
While such a combination might seem plausible on the surface (a relatively open society
“importing” the seeds of conflict), it is more likely that this model is either a collection of
individual outlier cases or that it is held together by omitted background variables. Another
possibility is that the key causal variable in F2 is the “increasing number of neighboring
countries in conflict” one, which had already been found as contributing to conflict by the
PITF and in further research (de Waal, 2000: 1–34). In this case, the other descriptor (trade
openness) would be an epiphenomenon, i.e., a factor that correlates with the neighboring
conflicts variable without there being a relevant connection between the two.
Model F3
Countries characterized by increasing population and increasing GDP per capita and in-
creasing cropland. Additional characteristics are regime type stability and decreasing trade
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openness. The most likely outcome is an adverse regime change, with Argentina 1973 being
an example. Model sensitivity is 19% and specificity is 93%. There are some similarities
with F1: firstly, both models include an increasing population. Secondly, while F3 includes
an increase in GDP, the countries in F1 exhibit a decrease. This is not the contradiction
it may seem—Cle´ment (2004) has indicated that the economic shift in itself is relevant,
but not its direction. These similarities again lead us to the issue of social and economic
change. The model conforms to Huntington’s explanation, in that it looks at a static regime
in a situation of change. The regime is unable or unwilling to adapt to the changing circum-
stances, which leads to a violent confrontation that effects regime change. The descriptors
increasing cropland and decreasing trade openness do not add explanatory value. Beyond
infrequent conflicts between pastoralists and nomads in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa,
there is no theoretical reason why increasing cropland should contribute to conflict. De-
creasing trade openness might suggest international isolation of the country, possibly as a
result of a crackdown by the government, but this is highly speculative and merely reinforces
the importance of the regime variable. Accuracy characteristics and overlapping between
models are illustrated in Figure 1.
The conditions used in all three models are based on complex descriptors related to
temporal changes of input descriptors. The result justifies the temporal approach to the
increasing population+ 
GDP+cropland 
sens.    spec 
decreasing trade openess 
democracy and autocracy 
high but not changing 
     -> adverse regime changes 
F1
increasing border state
conflicts + trade openess 
sens.   spec. 
small country 
strongly decreasing GDP 
decreasing population 
->    
F2
F3 
11%, 98% 
10%, 97% 
,  
3%,  
99%
sensitivity and 
specificity in cases 
when two or three 
models are satisfied at 
the same time
increasing population + 
decreasing infant mortality
decreasing GDP per capita
growing urban population
non-decreasing number of conflicts
sens.   spec. 
ethnic war or complex
FIGURE 1 Models of the general concept of political instability with respective sensitivity
and specificity values. The OR combination of at least one of the three satisfied models has
a sensitivity of 68% and a specificity of 65%. The results are based on 118 positive and 259
control cases.
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analysis of the PITF data set. But the results allow the conclusion that dynamic conditions
are more relevant than the absolute values of these variables in analyzing political instability.
For example, “changing quality of life or increasing GDP per capita” can have a much larger
impact on political stability than the actual absolute values of infant mortality and GDP
per capita. Additionally, some variables have different implications for different models.
One example is GDP per capita: in model F3, increasing GDP is a necessary condition
while models F1 and F2 both detect decreasing GDP as an additional, but not necessary
characteristic of unstable countries. Furthermore, we have an increasing total population
in models F1 and F3 as a necessary condition and a decreasing population in model F2 as
an additional characteristic. These results demonstrate the importance of partitioning the
group of positive cases into subgroups. In other words, different countries seem to follow
different paths toward political instability.
Immanent Danger of Political Instability
From the M data set, we induced immanent characteristics of countries that eventually
experienced political instability. The most frequently detected properties are an increasing
population, a small percentage of urban population, changes in labor force and a not com-
pletely democratic government (a Polity score below 7).4 The following specific models
have been detected:
Model M1
Countries characterized by a very low percentage of urban population (below 41%) and a
change of leadership. Additional characteristics are large changes in the total labor force
and a changing level of democracy. A typical case of this model is Haiti in1991. Model
sensitivity is 25% and specificity is 89%.
Model M2
Countries characterized by low percentage of urban population (below 55%) and changing
infant mortality. Additional characteristics are large changes in total labor force and increas-
ing population. Jordan 1967 represents a good example of this model. Model sensitivity is
62% and specificity is 77%.
Model M3
Countries characterized by low, but rapidly changing percentage of urban population (below
50%). Large changes in the total labor force represent an additional characteristic. One of
the cases from M3 is South Africa 1967. Model sensitivity is 49% and specificity is 86%.
Models M1 to M3 conform to Huntington’s general proposition that modernizing so-
cieties are at a special risk of instability and conflict. Further, low percentage of urban
population is a constant property that represents a necessary (if not sufficient) condition.
The large segment of rural population indicates that these are underdeveloped and modern-
izing countries. A political crisis ensues when a proximate cause is added to this structural
4The Polity score is drawn from the Polity IV data set. It stands for the difference be-
tween the two variables showing the degree of democracy (DEMOC) and autocracy (AUTOC)
in a country. Since these have values between 0 and 10, the Polity score ranges from –10
(completely autocratic) to 10 (completely democratic). The Polity IV data set is available at
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.
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condition, e.g., a change in leadership (M1), a change in the quality of life (M2), or increas-
ing urbanization (M3).
The models M1 to M3, which describe the immanent features of unstable cases, seem
very well suited to point out the crucial factors differentiating stable from unstable countries.
The models rely more on attributes differentiating developing and developed countries. This
is reflected primarily in the attribute “low percentage of urban population” that is present in
all models, and the condition “changing labor force,” which is a supporting characteristic
for these models. In contrast to models induced from the F data set, models describing
immanent characteristics of politically unstable states have a somewhat higher accuracy.
This shows that socioeconomic descriptors included into the PITF data set are better for
differentiating between unstable and stable countries than for building concrete political
instability models.
Specific Conditions for the Onset of Instability
In the S set, negative cases were generated only from the countries that had experienced
instability in a time period at least 5 years prior to or after the negative case. Hence, we
expected that the models induced would reflect specific conditions that contributed to the
immediate onset of political instability. The following models have been constructed:
Model S1
Countries characterized by rapidly changing infant mortality but no significant change in
GDP per capita. Additional characteristics are a relatively high maximum level of democ-
racy, and a large agricultural population. This model is exemplified by Gambia 1994. Model
sensitivity is 25% and specificity is 94%. The rapid change in infant mortality points toward
major changes in the quality of life. A large agricultural population combined with a formal
system of democracy and economic stagnation suggests that these are countries that were
suffering from an economic crisis, possibly in combination with uneven development. The
economic situation might then have been ripe for exploitation by elite actors capitalizing
on popular unrest, which eventually led to regime change.
Model S2
Countries characterized by semi-democracy (Polity score above -5) and a change in mem-
bership in regional organizations. Additional characteristics are an increasing GDP and a
changing size of forest cover. Albania 1996 is a typical representative of this subgroup.
Model sensitivity is 26% and specificity is 93%. Having a democracy score somewhere be-
tween 0 and 7 on the Polity scale, these regimes can be considered anocracies. This model
most likely captures countries in transition that had previously emerged from single-party
or military rule and taken some steps towards a true polyarchy which makes their political
system highly vulnerable. The variable “changing membership in regional organizations”
is hard to interpret. A changing membership reflects either diplomatic realignment or deep-
ening regional integration. Since semi-democracies are less stable than other regimes types
(Hegre et al., 2001), inclusion of this variable means that this model most likely covers a
group of countries in transition.
The models induced from the S set have low sensitivity scores and a relatively low
level of accuracy. Beyond the regime characteristic (where both models exclude highly
autocratic countries), the models have no common features. A possible interpretation for
this phenomenon is that generalizing specific conditions for the onset of political instability
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is a very difficult task. Instead, onset might be influenced more strongly by context- and
case-specific factors. To understand the problem of political instability, it is necessary to
integrate the models obtained from the S set with conditions detected in set M. This is
especially relevant for the conditions based on the type of government. From set M we have
learned that nondemocratic countries have a larger risk of instability while the S set points
out the relative dangers of nonautocracy. These two specific properties, combined into the
general proposition that semi-democracies are at a higher risk of instability, support the
findings of the PITF as well as of the quantitative literature on civil war.
Toward a Unified Concept of Political Instability
The induced models and their expert evaluation allow for the extraction of some general
conclusions about the causes of political instability. A very simple proposition to be inferred
is that instability and its onset are a very complicated process that cannot be predicted solely
from static socioeconomic data. In that respect, our results confirm those reported by the
PITF. However, the induced models allow for some further theorizing.
Summarizing the results, we can say that instability is characteristic of countries with a
high share of rural population undergoing significant social, economic or political change.
Fast population growth and a change in GDP are important supporting indicators. A fully
developed, “mature” system of democracy seems to able to absorb problems associated with
social change, and a high level of democracy is a key characteristic of countries without
immanent danger of instability. Onset of political instability usually happens in periods of
political transition. This is a fairly trivial observation, but it has to be pointed out that a
hybrid regime is not a sufficient condition by itself; it needs to be accompanied by periods
of rapid or unbalanced economic and social changes to escalate into crisis. Other proximate
risk factors seem to be changes in the country’s leadership as well as conflict in neighboring
countries.
Our exclusion of positive cases where the country in question had not been independent
for at least 5 years before instability set in might have introduced selection bias. However,
such bias, if present at all, will likely have caused us to underestimate the robustness of
the factors identified. Previous research (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) has shown that countries
are at a significantly higher risk for conflict for a few years after independence. While they
propose no theory as to why this might be the case, our findings support the notion that
this increase is due to the attendant political transition which is accompanied by social and
economic change. In addition, newly independent countries since 1945 have usually been
overwhelmingly poor which correlates strongly with large population growth. All of these
are factors that show up as highly relevant in our model.
Discussion and Conclusions
The relevance of the work presented in this paper lies in the effort to use the novel methodol-
ogy of subgroup discovery that had not previously been used to analyze social science data.
The methodology is able to produce results that go beyond those obtained by other quanti-
tative studies. What the new methodology provides is a) the automatic detection of relevant
subconcepts and b) a concise description of subgroups through co-occurring variables.
As regards the first point, the automatic detection of subgroups is relevant whenever
a complicated target concept like political instability can be more effectively described by
breaking it down into different but potentially nonexclusive subconcepts. The advantage of
the subgroup discovery approach is that expert knowledge is not necessary for this step. More
importantly, expert-generated subgroups might be inappropriate: in our research, neither
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regional nor religious properties show up as central features or as descriptive properties of
the induced subgroups. As to the type of instability, it should be noted that models F1 and
F3 predominantly describe adverse regime changes while F2 mainly corresponds to ethnic
wars and complex cases (see Figure 1). This suggests that ethnic wars and adverse regime
changes really have different causal backgrounds.
Additionally, different subgroups may have the same relevant variables but with op-
posite effects. For example, models F1 and F2 identified decreasing GDP per capita as an
indicator of crisis while F3 included increasing GDP per capita as a crucial variable. In
such cases, the search for globally relevant variables may completely fail to detect such
descriptors even though they are relevant for each subconcept. In this way the subgroup
discovery approach may prevent such important variables from being overlooked.
The second advantage of this methodology is the explicit construction of models by
co-occurring factors in a form directly and easily interpretable by researchers with expertise
about cases or the subject matter. In this paper, expert evaluation showed that most models
corresponded to existing research results on mass political violence. Even when single
variables or whole models were identified as not directly useful these variables or models
may be subjected to further analysis, e.g., in the form of process tracing (George & Bennett,
2005). We cannot expect a revolutionary, novel theory about political instability from the
methodology at hand, but the results are relevant because they give some added weight to
previously existing theories, such as Huntington’s theory of political development.
From a methodological point of view, the agreement between induced models and
existing research demonstrates that the methodology is able to detect relevant correlations
from the available data without expert knowledge. This will be useful for future applications
of this methodology, especially for disciplines and problems without a sufficiently developed
theoretical background.
The results demonstrate the relevance of the temporal analysis of available data. Al-
though there are variables (like the percentage of urban population or the level of democracy)
where absolute or mean values are relevant, a complete understanding of the problem is not
possible without analyzing changes in the values of the variables. Changes in total popula-
tion, GDP and infant mortality seem to have an especially high significance. Interestingly
enough, the absolute values of these variables have not been detected as relevant.
The final advantage of the applied methodology is that it can accept a large number of
input variables even when the number of cases is modest. In contrast to multivariate logistic
regression modeling which needs to have preliminary single-variable correlation tests in
order to reduce the number of inputs and ensure the construction of reasonable models, in
the subgroup discovery approach a further expansion of the number of input variables is
possible. This enables an effective handling of temporal properties of input variables, which
may also be relevant for other applications in the social sciences.
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